This is going quite off-topic, but anyway...
Your other assertion, regarding breaking TLS 1.0 to be trivial, begs for a citation. I do not believe that is true. The "danger" in TLS 1.0, as it stands today, is purely theoretical.
About this forum's TLS, yes I see I am getting email from this forum now in plain text while in flight, as this forum's email server is currently setup to refuse to speak TLS 1.0 (which is the only TLS my personal email server supports). Surely, plain text must be much more secure than opportunistic TLS 1.0 for the SMTP stream...
My logs:
That above is a SMTP transaction were the STARTTLS verb fails, because the TLS negotiation has failed among both email servers, and then the forum's email server is reconnecting to retry to send the email now without using the STARTTLS verb, i.e., in plain text. So much for security!
As a comparison, Google is currently DISREGARDING RFC-8996 and accepting email through TLS 1.0-encrypted SMTP streams, because some crypto is always better than no crypto. My logs:
I think we can assume that Google/Gmail know email. If TLS 1.0 is good enough for them, it should be fine also here. But that is only my opinion.
It is true TLS 1.0 has been officially deprecated (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8996/ , one month ago).With regards to TLS 1.0, that should not be kept around at all. It is trivial to break into a TLS 1.0 stream, and this is why is has been nearly completely deprecated.
Your other assertion, regarding breaking TLS 1.0 to be trivial, begs for a citation. I do not believe that is true. The "danger" in TLS 1.0, as it stands today, is purely theoretical.
You can get a SSL certificate today and use it no problem with an OpenSSL implementation that supports only TLS 1.0. TLS is a transport protocol, whose features are orthogonal to the PKI certificates themselves.You cannot even get a cert now that will support it, at least not from any reputable provider. Oh, and for the record, the current cert on this site only supports TLS 1.2 and 1.3, it does not support TLS1.0 or 1.1.
About this forum's TLS, yes I see I am getting email from this forum now in plain text while in flight, as this forum's email server is currently setup to refuse to speak TLS 1.0 (which is the only TLS my personal email server supports). Surely, plain text must be much more secure than opportunistic TLS 1.0 for the SMTP stream...
My logs:
Code:
Apr 19 23:20:36 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: warning: 104.192.220.12: address not listed for hostname vintage-computer.com
Apr 19 23:20:36 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: connect from unknown[104.192.220.12]
Apr 19 23:20:37 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: setting up TLS connection from unknown[104.192.220.12]
Apr 19 23:20:37 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: warning: network_biopair_interop: error reading 5 bytes from the network: Connection reset by peer
Apr 19 23:20:37 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: SSL_accept error from unknown[104.192.220.12]: -1
Apr 19 23:20:37 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: lost connection after STARTTLS from unknown[104.192.220.12]
Apr 19 23:20:37 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: disconnect from unknown[104.192.220.12]
Apr 19 23:20:37 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: warning: 104.192.220.12: address not listed for hostname vintage-computer.com
Apr 19 23:20:37 gran postfix/smtpd[1608]: connect from unknown[104.192.220.12]
That above is a SMTP transaction were the STARTTLS verb fails, because the TLS negotiation has failed among both email servers, and then the forum's email server is reconnecting to retry to send the email now without using the STARTTLS verb, i.e., in plain text. So much for security!
As a comparison, Google is currently DISREGARDING RFC-8996 and accepting email through TLS 1.0-encrypted SMTP streams, because some crypto is always better than no crypto. My logs:
Code:
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/pickup[5182]: 276FE1200: uid=1000 from=<XXXXXX@YYYYYYYY.com>
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/cleanup[6624]: 276FE1200: message-id=<20210420194229.GC2538@YYYYYYYYY.com>
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/qmgr[926]: 276FE1200: from=<XXXXXX@YYYYYYYY.com>, size=843, nrcpt=3 (queue active)
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/smtp[6626]: setting up TLS connection to gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/smtp[6626]: certificate verification failed for gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com: num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/smtp[6626]: certificate verification failed for gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com: num=27:certificate not trusted
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/smtp[6626]: certificate verification failed for gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com: num=7:certificate signature failure
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/smtp[6626]: Unverified: subject_CN=mx.google.com, issuer=GTS CA 1O1
Apr 20 21:42:32 gran postfix/smtp[6626]: TLS connection established to gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com: TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)
Apr 20 21:42:34 gran postfix/smtp[6626]: 276FE1200: to=<ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ@gmail.com>, relay=gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com[173.194.76.26]:25, delay=2.4, delays=0.24/0.14/0.49/1.5, dsn=2.0.0, status=sent (250 2.0.0 OK 1618947754 u10si43968wri.125 - gsmtp)
Apr 20 21:42:34 gran postfix/qmgr[926]: 276FE1200: removed
I think we can assume that Google/Gmail know email. If TLS 1.0 is good enough for them, it should be fine also here. But that is only my opinion.